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This paper tries to shed light on traditional and current observations that 
give support to the idea that language is subject to critical period effects. It is 
suggested that this idea is not adequately grounded on a view on language 
as a developmental phenomenon which motivates the suggestion of moving 
from the now classic concept of language as a ‘faculty’ to a new concept of 
language as a ‘gradient’: i.e. an aggregate of cognitive abilities, the weight of 
which is variable from one to another developmental stage, and which 
exercise crucial scaffolding effects on each other. Once this well-supported 
view is assumed, the idea of ‘critical period’ becomes an avoidable one, for 
language can instantiate different forms of gradation, none of which is in-
herently normal or deviant relatively to each other. In any event, a notion of 
‘criticality’ is retained within this view, yet simply to name the transitional 
effects of scaffolding influences within the gradient. 
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The end-state is not coded anywhere. 
Thelen & Smith (1994: 49) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When thinking about the suitability of the ‘critical period’ concept to the parti-
cular case of the acquisition of languages, there exist two preliminary questions 
that cannot be avoided: (i) What is (and what is not) a critical period for the dev-
elopment of any given organic capacity? (ii) Does language actually belong to the 
kind of phenomena to which the concept may be aptly applied? Surprisingly 
enough, an ample majority of the sources on the topic of the critical period for 
language seem to sidestep both questions. As for the second question, while lang-
uage is customarily referred to as the target of critical period effects in the 
relevant literature, what one ultimately discovers is that what is suggested there 
to be subject to such effects are the putative organic bases underlying the acqui-
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sition, storing or use of languages; so on reflection, the corresponding approaches 
seem to implicitly adhere to the view that languages are not qua languages the 
locus of critical period effects. As for the first question, most views seem to 
conceptualize the critical period for language as a scheduling of sorts, which 
inadvertently introduces an unacceptable teleological bias into a developmental 
matter. In this paper, after reviewing the current consensus about why and how 
language is specifically thought to be a capacity subject to maturational control or 
critical period effects, we argue that by means of a clarification of the develop-
mental character of languages and, in parallel, of critical period effects in dev-
elopmental phenomena at large, one may avoid the cumulative odd implications 
of connecting these two issues.  
 In the second section of this paper we review the most important pieces of 
evidence that have in the last fifty years or so been collected in support of the 
idea that learning a language is subject to critical period effects. After that, we 
explain in section 3 that different contemporary views on language base their 
ideas about the individual process of internalizing a language on problematic as-
sumptions about the boundaries between ‘what acquires’ and ‘what is acquired’ 
in this critical domain of human cognition. Such a critique is aimed at paving the 
way to a new conceptualization of language that, based upon invigorated versi-
ons of the ideas of ‘behavioral gradient’ and ‘cognitive hybridization’, we claim is 
better positioned than its traditional counterparts in order to test how language 
behaves regarding the nature of the maturational effects to which it is specifically 
subject. Our position on this particular concern is then unfolded in section 4, 
where we claim that avoiding some traditional preconceptions, language may 
unproblematically be incorporated into and treated within the parameters of an 
emergent theoretical trend that envisions development as the most basic mani-
festation of life and as a open-ended process in every single entity that manifests 
it. We thus conclude that despite the fact that certain developmental milestones 
typically punctuate the growth of language in the individual, it is not affected by 
any kind of critical period effect proper. We contend in section 5 that an 
important sample of neurobiological evidence supports such a view. Some other 
interesting conclusions follow regarding the existence of normal and deviant 
instantiations of language, with which we briefly close the paper.  
 
 
2. The Received View: An Overview 
 
It has been known for a long time that children are more apt than adults to learn 
non-native linguistic systems. To wit, Juan Huarte de San Juan, one of the 
founding figures of the field of Cognitive Psychology (see Chomsky 1966, 1968; 
Virués Ortega 2005), expressed with the following words in 1575 what for many 
continues to sound as a paradox (Newport 1990; Jackendoff 1991): 
 
The extent to which imagination and understanding seem to be improper 
skills in order to learn languages is clearly demonstrated by childhood, for 
while being the age at which men are the less gifted in them both, yet 
children, as already observed by Aristotle, learn any single language better 
than older men, in spite of the latter being more rational. And no one needs 
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to remember us this, for common experience amply shows it, as when a 
thirty or forty years old native from Biscay [Basque Country] comes to 
Castile, and he never learns the Romance language, but if he is a child, 
within two or three years he looks as if born in Toledo. 
(Huarte de San Juan 1575/1991: 151; authors’ translation)  
 
If one wants to learn Latin or any other language, she better does it while 
still a child, for if she waits until the body becomes rigid and gains its proper 
perfection, she will never succeed. 
(Huarte de San Juan 1575/1991: 60; authors’ translation) 
 
 Efforts at scientifically clarifying this paradox had however to wait some 
four hundred years, after the focus was again put on the question by Wilder Pen-
field and Lamar Roberts (Penfield & Roberts 1959; see Lenneberg 1960), paving 
the way to the ground breaking work of Eric Lenneberg (Lenneberg 1967), to 
whom present conceptions and factual knowledge on the issue are profoundly in 
debt. As a matter of fact, Lenneberg’s landmark postulation of a critical period 
for language acquisition, as an associated aspect to its maturationally controlled 
character, was a generalization based on his first-hand observations on the 
recovery patterns from traumatic aphasias at different age ranges, starting from 
very young children. Specifically, he discovered that children before 3 years 
(re)acquired their mother tongue almost as if they had not suffered any trauma, 
but that from that point on the following pattern was attested: From 4 to 10 years, 
gradual (re)acquisition without residual signs of impairment; around 15 years, 
gradual (re)acquisition with residual signs of impairment; and from 15 years on, 
unpredictable pattern of recovery, as it is typical of adult aphasias associated to 
strokes and so on. From these observations, Lenneberg concluded that a window 
of opportunity existed for first language acquisition that extended from age 2 
until the onset of puberty, out of which normal levels of grammatical competence 
were not guaranteed at all. The indirectness of Lenneberg’s method, far from 
problematic, was the perfect strategy to remedy the (fortunate) scarcity of related 
natural experiments—as children almost unexceptionally receive sufficient lingu-
istic stimulation from the very onset of the relevant period, and the (obvious) 
ethical impediments to perform them in artificial conditions. Nevertheless, some 
new cases of feral children were known and studied with care after Lenneberg’s 
untimely death, yet only to confirm his predictions (Curtiss 1977; see also Curtiss 
1988 for a résumé). Moreover, a whole new field of linguistic research was con-
currently being opened, namely the study of the signed languages used in deaf 
communities, which offered particularly valuable direct information on the im-
pact of age on first language acquisition, for contrarily to non-hearing-impaired 
children, deaf children may start their contacts with signed languages at rather 
different ages due to their very different medical and sociological circumstances. 
Again, conclusions in this new field were in complete agreement with Lenne-
berg’s hypothesis, at the same time that they served to refine the character of the 
decline along the age axis within the critical period (Newport 1984).  
 Incidentally mentioned by Lenneberg (1967: 176), but left unexplored in his 
book, was the question of how the hypothesis applied to the fact that not only the 
onset of first language acquisition may in certain exceptional situations vary from 
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one to another individual, but that this is actually the most common pattern 
when people learn second languages beyond their native ones. A logical expec-
tation regarding this would be that an endowment to successfully acquire lingu-
istic systems is unlocked permanently if exercised with a first system at the right 
time. But as we all know well, this is not what is actually attested. The locus 
classicus of the experimental study of the impact of age effects on second 
language acquisition is Johnson & Newport (1989), where the following findings 
are reported. In highly competent bilinguals whose contact with the second 
language started at different ages, competence is almost indistinguishable from 
that of native controls when contact started from 3 to 7 years. From that age to 15, 
a lineal decline is observed as we approximate to this upper age limit; moreover, 
a strong correlation seems to exist between competence level and onset of 
exposure in that most people show a similar level within each particular age. 
Finally, when the contact started from 15 years on, levels of competence are 
generally (but not necessarily) lower than when it did at previous ages and, more 
importantly, the strong correlation between competence level and onset of expo-
sure vanishes: People show extremely variable levels of competence at each parti-
cular age.  
 While Johnson and Newport’s findings offer a certainly detailed and well-
motivated image of the impact of the age factor on the human capacity to acquire 
non-native linguistic systems, a limitation of this study, obviously enough 
dictated by practical reasons, was that it exclusively concentrated on the domains 
of morphology and syntax (or ‘compositional domains’ in Newport 1990), thus 
excluding (‘non-compositional’) aspects of linguistic competence like mastery of 
phonology or lexical knowledge. In any event, the question of the critical period 
in relation to phonology had previously been touched upon by Asher & García 
(1969) and Oyama (1976), with not completely identical but nevertheless rather 
convergent results. According to both sources in populations not very dissimilar 
to the one studied by Johnson and Newport, ‘foreign accent effects’ were in-
creasingly observed in parallel with the increase of the onset of the contact with 
the non-native system. Besides, a strong contrast was observed between those 
whose contact started before or after 12 years, while differences intensify only 
gradually within the 6- to 12-years range. A divergent result of the two above-
mentioned studies is that, while Oyama’s informants whose contacts with the 
second language started around 6 years were judged within the range of native 
controls, Asher and García’s counterparts were not. Whatever the reasons for this 
clash, more recent research concludes that the onset of the age of exposure to a 
second language may be critically reflected on foreign accent effects simply with 
a delay of one year relative to the first language (Hyltenstam & Abrahamsson 
2003; Meisel 2013), with similar observations being applicable to the acquisition 
of a second dialect by in-migrant families with children (Labov 2010: 416–417). So 
it seems that the opportunity to attain native-like levels of competence that 
extends until ±7 years in the morpho-syntactic domain does not apply to the case 
of phonology, while the onset of puberty continues to be a critical frontier also in 
this domain. Complementing such observations, research conducted in the do-
main of lexical knowledge lead to the conclusion that competence levels are not 
significantly different between native speakers and those whose onset of expo-
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sure to the same language started no later than at 11–13 years of age (Weber-Fox 
& Neville 1996). So the onset of puberty continues to be a Rubicon of sorts also in 
this domain, but a window of opportunity extends until that age stronger than in 
the case of phonology and morpho-syntax that allows attaining native-like levels 
of competence for a longer period.  
 Of course, many details and discussions could be added to this overview. 
For example, it has been argued that some aspects of morpho-syntax show a 
behavior closer to that of phonology than to other aspects of the same domain 
(Weber-Fox & Neville 1996). In any event, the picture thus far presented is a 
reliable synthesis of the consensus view, which may be enough to reflect on how 
data should be interpreted respecting the best criteria currently offered by 
different fields of expertise devoted to developmental matters. So before closing 
this section, let us briefly summarize the most basic points that readers should 
keep in mind in the remainder of this paper: (i) The onset of puberty seems to be 
a crucial landmark regarding the human capacity to acquire linguistic systems; 
(ii) before that point, languages can be acquired unproblematically and attaining 
high competence levels. (iii) In any event, aspects of language seem to be differ-
entially affected along this temporal axis: Namely, (iv) phonology and certain 
aspects of morpho-syntax seem to be exposed to a decay prior to other aspects of 
the latter domain, while (v) lexical knowledge related abilities seem to remain 
stable until the end of this critical period.  
 
 
3. What Is Language, that It May Develop…1 
 
Describing children’s speech with adult grammatical categories […] automatically sets the devel-
opmental problem in terms of goals rather than in terms of origins. 
Michel & Moore (1995: 370) 
 
A complicating factor when dealing with questions like the subject matter of this 
paper is the multifaceted meaning of the word ‘language’, which different tradi-
tions and authors use to refer to rather disparate things. The opening pages of 
Chomsky (1986) contain a comprehensive analysis of this state of affairs, a source 
of difficulties that undermine productive discussions that could eventually lead 
to more agreed-upon conclusions in critical areas of our understanding of this 
distinctive feature of the human species. According to Chomsky’s examination, 
concepts of ‘language’ range from physicalist interpretations, according to which 
language exists in materialized utterances (meaningful noises, printed material, 
and so on) to which linguistic properties somehow inhere, to psychological ones, 
for which such properties are derivative from the mind that projects them into 
utterances. Correspondingly, ‘language’ is understood as something ‘given out 
there’, in the world external to speakers/hearers (‘E-Language’), or as something 
deeply rooted in the human mind, thus internal to speakers/hearers (‘I-
Language’). Followers of the respective views thereby understand that the 
human mind is either a more or less passive receptacle of the regularities 
                                                
1  The headings of sections 3 and 4 are inspired by the title of Piattelli-Palamarini (2009). 
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underlying the organization of utterances, or its source, actively devoted to the 
acquisition and use of particular instantiations of language according to a priori 
patterns common to them all.  
 The aim of the following pages is not to decide which one of these 
competing views is on the right track. As readers will note as the paper moves 
forward, our position is somehow in a middle ground, as it emphasizes the 
hybrid character of language (in a sense to be presently made clear), yet believing 
that it is a mind-based capacity to create and take advantage of such hybrid 
products. The specific goal of the next sub-section is to show that despite differ-
ences, such divergent views as those sketched out above share common or 
related shortcomings that have hitherto prevented them from offering satis-
factory answers to the question whether the critical period concept applies or not 
to language: Namely, they both rely on problematic assumptions regarding how 
boundaries should be defined between biological and non-biological aspects of 
language, or between more or less central biological aspects of language. A 
subsequent sub-section introduces a new concept of language that seems better 
qualified in order to overcome these problems.  
 
3.1. Does Language Develop? The Whats and Whys of a Negationist Consensus 
 
Children start experiencing the world as non-linguistic beings, who nevertheless 
attain the mastery of the intricate properties of human languages within a few 
years, traversing along the way a series of distinctive stages and milestones. This 
is a seemingly innocent and uncontroversial claim, with which most laypeople 
would unhesitatingly agree. It is for this reason that the fact comes as a surprise 
that many past and present approaches to the question of language acquisition 
are based on theoretical models that incorporate the entailment that language 
does not belong to the kind of phenomena that properly follow a developmental 
path of individual growth. This is particularly clear in the case of the Vygotskian 
and Piagetian approaches that paved the way to the whole field of expertise that 
we recognize today as Developmental Psychology (Piaget 1962; Vygotsky 1986). 
In both cases, a gap of sorts is created between cognitive ontogeny proper, on the 
one hand, and the mental implementation of psychological contents, such as 
language, on the other hand. Clearly enough, the gap is somehow softened by the 
promiscuity and mutually reactive dynamics that the corresponding layers ulti-
mately attain; yet it is clear that they belong to different realms, so to speak, for 
the former (Vygotsky’s ‘lower functions’) can be unproblematically assimilable to 
other ‘natural functions’ that undergo normal development (up to the ‘formal 
operational stage’, in the case of Piaget), while the latter (corresponding to Vy-
gotsky’s ‘higher’ or ‘cultural’ functions, or to Piaget’s ‘intellectual development’) 
are rather the outcome of the cumulative accommodation to such natural archi-
tectures of externally given and independently existing contents (corresponding, 
in the case of language, to what Chomsky 1986 critically refers to as tokens of an 
‘E-language’). 
 But maybe more striking is the fact that the theoretical perspective that has 
hitherto adopted the most radically naturalistic stance on language (Chomsky 
2000a, 2002) has at the same time encouraged a view on acquisition that under-
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scores the idea that languages, as a matter of fact, do not develop in the mind of 
children (Lorenzo 2013).2 Based on logical arguments having to do with the 
poverty of the linguistic stimuli to guide bona fide processes of rule induction, 
which may be traced back as far as to Chomsky (1959), Chomskyan linguistics 
has traditionally embraced the thesis that children must therefore face their first 
contacts with the adults’ linguistic utterances with a mental blueprint of sorts 
containing detailed information about the basic building blocks and structures of 
any possible human language; actually, so detailed and/or efficacious as to pave 
the way to full-fledged linguistic systems in a virtually instantaneous way 
(Chomsky 1975, 1980, 2000b). In parallel to this central tenet, it is also argued that 
the seemingly ‘non-instantaneous’ course that acquiring a language follows is 
just a deceiving appearance, due to ‘difficulties’ and ‘delays’ mostly explicable by 
the maturational path of the associated neuroanatomical systems that allow the 
individual to put into use her knowledge of language (Hyams 1986).3 Attending 
to this ‘consensus view’ (Hornstein et al. 2005) within the nowadays mainstream 
‘biolinguistic’ position (Boeckx & Grohmann 2013), it is not surprising that the 
most relevant among recent efforts to explain the maturational effects observed 
in relation to different modalities of language acquisition, actually point to some 
putatively language-associated systems as the locus of such effects, instead of 
suggesting more language-centered proposals. Let us briefly review two of them.  
 According to one such popular explanation, customarily referred to as the 
‘less is more’ model (Newport 1990), the critical period effect on language is the 
direct consequence of the accomplishment of the mature version of the short-
term (working) memory device on which analytical procedures are executed 
when trying to discover and fix rule systems from the incoming input in 
language acquisition processes. The more underdeveloped this device, according 
to Newport’s argument, the better to the rule-extraction operations, for the device 
operates then on small chunks, which are much easier to analyze and make sense 
of than the chunks that the device retains in active memory when it attains 
maturity. Note that the hypothesis is in itself neutral regarding the question 
whether analyses are or are not based on a preexistent linguistic blueprint, but it 
nevertheless relies on the premise that the criteria on which analyses are based 
remain the same all along the process: In other words, what is subject to 
maturation and gives rise to the somehow deceiving appearance of decay in the 
capacity for acquiring languages, is actually a language-associated (but not 
language-specific) memory system, and not properly the language faculty. This 
                                                
2  The most explicit statement of this position is by Fodor (1985: 35), who wrote: “Deep down, 
I’m inclined to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive development in the sense devel-
opmental cognitive psychologists have had in mind”. 
3  Two main proposals have been made within Chomskyan linguistics in order to make 
compatible the strong ‘aprioristic’ stance of the trend and the obvious fact that languages 
develop anyway. The first one is Borer & Wexler’s (1987) ‘maturational hypothesis’, accord-
ing to which languages unfold following a schedule that is an added component part of the 
preinstalled program also containing the general guidelines of every single language; the 
second one is Yang’s (2002) ‘variational hypothesis’, which holds that particular parts of the 
inborn universal grammar unfold as a function of the relative frequency of the correspond-
ing environmental triggers. Both frameworks thus remain strongly anchored in the extreme 
nativism of mainstream Chomskyan linguistics. 
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aspect of Newport’s thesis makes it particularly suitable to work in association 
with the Chomskyan nativist stance regarding the specifically linguistic dimen-
sion of the language acquisition device. Note, however, that the idea is also com-
patible with a Vygotskyan–Pieagetian reading, according to which Newport’s 
device serves to decipher entirely public or external rule systems. 
 According to another serious attempt to explain the effect of age on lang-
uage acquisition (Ullman 2001), it is suggested that the critical period is actually a 
side effect of the maturational tension between two memory systems, differently 
committed to the task of acquiring a language: Namely, a ‘procedural’ memory 
in charge of learning, representing and using automatized compositional rout-
ines (and thus implied in morpho-syntax), and a ‘declarative’ memory in charge 
of factual knowledge and arbitrary associations (and thus implied in lexical 
knowledge). According to Ullman’s hypothesis, there exists a maturational mis-
match between these systems, for the former is subject to decay from pre-
pubertal ages, while the latter’s decay only begins after the onset of puberty. Due 
to this mismatch, from the age the critical period is customarily supposed to end 
onwards, the declarative system is forced to apply in the learning of rule systems 
governing the composition of words and phrases on the basis of generalizations 
from models, thus basically treating them as idiomatically frozen items. So again, 
it is not the language faculty per se what is supposed to be subject to an age-
associated decay according to this hypothesis, but systems external to this faculty 
(Chomsky 1995; Hauser et al. 2002), which impact on how speakers give lang-
uage-particular contents to it and how these contents (i.e., language-particular 
rule systems and associated lexicons) are put into use in real settings. 
 This is not the place to evaluate the merits of these hypotheses at large. The 
point of the previous comments is that recent serious efforts to offer bona fide 
explanations to the critical period for language acquisition point to causes that do 
not even touch the alternative of languages being the true locus of such 
maturational effect, opting instead for explicating it as a delusory side-effect of 
sorts of the maturational schedule of certain language-related external systems. 
Such a position actually has a reinforcing effect on the two influential views on 
language referred to above: Namely, one that privileges the idea that languages 
are externally or public givens, not properly subject to organic development (but 
rather to ‘acculturation’ or ‘intellectual development’); and another one that 
privileges the alternative view that languages are so deeply rooted in the human 
organism that they do not need to properly develop, being instead subjected to 
an almost instantaneous ‘triggering’ process. We are obviously aware that these 
two stances do not exhaust present-day conceptualizations of language, but we 
think that other representative efforts of somehow naturalizing language fall 
some point in between them, without really correcting the main shortcomings of 
such an intent that we are criticizing here.4  
                                                
4  In a nutshell, current theoretical models of language describe a wide spectrum, ranging 
from cognitivist/functionalist oriented models that highlight the character of languages as 
socio-cultural achievements assimilable by general cognitive devices and principles (Croft & 
Cruse 2004), to Generativist oriented approaches that accentuate the biological character of 
language as a specific cognitive organ (Anderson & Lightfoot 2002). Middle-ground positi-
ons obviously exist (e.g., the rather convergent models of Construction Grammar and 
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 For the time being, let us then concentrate on the Vygotskyan–Piagetian 
and the Chomskyan views thus far reviewed, which, despite their very obvious 
discrepancies, nevertheless share the rather shocking feature of protecting lang-
uages from being properly considered outputs of developmental processes. 
According to our diagnosis, this is so because both approaches embrace certain 
pervasive forms of dualism, each of a different pedigree, but both equally 
problematic: As for the first one, it has been criticized and referred to before in 
the literature as the ‘culture-biology dualism’ (Michel & Moore 1995; Oyama 
2000a); as for the second one, not having to our knowledge received a specific 
denomination up till now, we will refer to it here as the ‘underpinnings-capacity 
dualism’.5 
 The ‘culture-biology’ dualism, on the one hand, is the (usually ‘implicit’; 
Michel & Moore 1995: 72) assumption that traditional forms of shared knowledge 
and/or behavior correspond to a distinct ontological realm and, correspondingly, 
that they are individually internalized by means also specific to the objects of that 
realm. Internalization, the story goes, obviously requires a biological machinery, 
which is also relevant in the long-term fixation, retrieving and practice of the 
related activities. In any event, the relation between such an organic ground and 
the superimposed cultural contents is one of accommodation of the latter to the 
former, even if more dynamic views have been also implemented where the 
cultural superstratum impacts on the biological layer, fine-tuning it as to pave the 
way to further cultural enhancements (Jablonka & Lamb 2005). In any event, the 
‘biological core’ and the ‘overlying cultural’ stratum remain distinct despite such 
functional and developmental promiscuities. The most obvious present mani-
festation of this form of dualism is the common distinction between ‘languages’ 
as diversified cultural or traditional accomplishments, and ‘(the faculty of) lang-
uage’ as the uniform biological background that makes possible the acquisition 
and use of such cultural artifacts.6 
 The ‘underpinnings-capacity’ dualism, on the other hand, is the assump-
tion (usually implicit as well) that a further distinction may also be made bet-
ween ‘language’, as an organic faculty containing the bare essentials of any 
possible language-particular system, and the ‘underpinnings’, ‘foundations’, 
‘basis’, ‘equipment’ or ‘biological correlate’ (see Lenneberg 1967; Lieberman 2006; 
Boeckx 2013; Piattelli-Palmarini 2013, among others) of such a cognitive organ 
(Anderson & Lightfoot 2002), notions that customarily, but rather vaguely, refer 
to aspects of the human anatomy and/or genotype. Actually, under the umbrella 
                                                                                                                                 
Simpler Syntax of Goldberg 2005 and Jackendoff & Culicover 2005), which nevertheless do 
not solve the tensions and dualisms (see below for details) on which modern linguistics is 
grounded. To wit, Tomasello’s (2003) usage-based theory of acquisition, framed within the 
model of Construction Grammar, explicitly assumes a sharp distinction between the 
biological and the cultural aspects and processes of language acquisition (Tomasello 2003: 
Ch. 8) and not surprisingly, it locates the question whether a critical period for language 
actually exists within the former domain (Tomasello 2003: 286–287). 
5  Maybe Kuo (1976: 94) approximates the most to what we have in mind, when criticizing a 
‘physiology-behavior dualism’ typical of the developmental study of behavior. 
6  For two recent sophisticated versions of this stance, see Balari & Lorenzo (2013) and Bicker-
ton (2014). The former have however advanced towards a more biologically nuanced 
position in Balari & Lorenzo (2015b), based on the idea of ‘scaffolding’ (see below). 
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of this distinction the whole field of expertise customarily referred to as ‘bio-
linguistics’ has grown in the last years (Boeckx & Grohmann 2013), conceived of 
as “a branch of cognitive sciences that focuses on uncovering the biological 
underpinnings of the human capacity to acquire at least one natural language” 
(Boeckx 2013: 1). Such an approach, perhaps inadvertently to its practitioners, 
contains the problematic entailment that a ‘capacity’ (and an assumedly ‘organic’ 
one) can be dissociated from its ‘biological underpinnings’, and ultimately that 
language (an assumedly biological object) can be somehow taken apart from its 
biology (whatever that means, if it makes any sense at all). 
 
3.2. An Alternative View: Setting the ‘Gradient of Language’ Concept 
 
What follows is a batch of suggestions aimed at instigating an image of language 
as the outcome of normal developmental processes, the conceptualization of 
which does not require something along the lines of the two forms of dualism 
thus far reviewed. In association with the set of premises that will be put forward 
in the next section, these suggestions should help (or hopefully so) deciphering 
the observations introduced in the first section, avoiding the conceptual compli-
cations that accumulate around the idea of ‘critical period’ in developmental 
studies at large, and specifically in the case of language. 
 The first such suggestion implies recovering and applying Kuo’s (1976) 
‘gradient’ concept to the case of language. Kuo’s main contention was that many 
and very different parts of an organism participate in any one of its various capa-
cities, but obviously enough with “differences in intensity and extent of involve-
ment for each of the different organs and different parts” (Kuo 1976: 92). Besides, 
the implication of parts as well as the intensity of single parts may vary in the 
temporal axis. To a certain degree this is due to the dynamics internal to the 
growing body (or ‘maturation’, in Schneirla’s 1966 sense), but also crucially to the 
kind and amount of environmental inputs that it receives throughout the process 
(or ‘experience’, in Schneirla’s 1966 also coincidental sense). Kuo’s ‘gradient’ con-
cept refers to the changing pattern of differently compromised pieces, both inter-
nal and external to the organism, which jointly compound the capacities that ulti-
mately manifest in expected forms of behavioral displays. This idea is readily 
transferable to language.  
 There is enough consensus now around the idea that language, in a sense, 
is but a heterogeneous assembly of bodily resources, ranging from motor to 
intentional abilities, which takes advantage of the component parts of organic 
systems with rather disparate non-linguistic specializations (respiration, 
digestion, long term and short term memory, mindreading skills, and so on). This 
is, for example, the idea under the ‘faculty of language in the broad sense’ (FLB) 
concept put forward in Hauser et al. (2002). We however disagree with this FLB 
concept in that it was specifically suggested in a context aimed at preserving 
another sense in which ‘language’ names a subset of FLB that may be deemed a 
language specifically committed part of our brains—the ‘faculty of language in 
the narrow sense’ (FLN), which acts as a center of gravity of sorts that a priori 
guarantees the linguistic distinctiveness of the human brain. However, most 
recent research conducted in order to locate brain activity when executing 
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linguistic tasks points to the direction that every single identified location is also 
routinely assembled for the execution of other non-linguistic tasks (see Stowe et 
al. 2005; Friederici 2011, for an overview), including the cortico-basal compu-
tational core that most reasonably corresponds to or contains Hauser et al.’s FLN 
(Balari & Lorenzo 2013, 2015a). So a more realistic picture than the one privileged 
by Hauser et al. seems to be one according to which no ‘faculty of language’ 
exists in the classical sense—not even a ‘narrow’ one, for such an idea proble-
matically purports that human brains incorporate a language-specifically dedi-
cated main component. Note that what is being questioned here is not a matter of 
localization, but of functional commitment, and that the more reasonable con-
clusion is one that supports the idea that language is, from root to branch, a 
collection of multipurpose components contingently recruited and develop-
mentally stabilized into a coherent functional unit. Also relevant to our point is 
Hauser et al.’s complementary observation that not every organic system that is 
active when exercising language should automatically be included into FLB, even 
if it is a necessary condition for conducting such an activity (say, the circulatory 
system). We think that taking all these observations together, the ‘gradient’ con-
cept is the one that less problematically can accommodate them, giving grounds 
to a concept of ‘language’ according to which the surrogate of the old ‘faculty’ is 
an array of interconnected capacities, each one differently involved (“in intensity 
and extent”; Kuo 1976: 92) in its linguistic specialization. According to this idea, 
the most involved a capacity in activities other than language, the less central its 
position in the linguistic functional system (Lieberman 2006), and the other way 
around. So the idea does not exclude the possibility that a core of highly specia-
lized brain activity exists of a linguistic nature (misleadingly inviting to pinpoint 
it as the ultimate site of language proper), while at the same time predicting its 
enacting in other non-linguistic activities as well. The main point of the idea is, 
however, that language ramifies according to a complex pattern of bodily acti-
vities, even if each branch may be described as showing a different extension and 
a different thickness in the overall pattern.  
 Two relevant ideas still need to be added to this implementation of the 
‘gradient’ concept to the case of language. The first one has to do with a 
shortcoming of Hauser et al.’s model, which entails a static and adultocentric 
view on language where each component belongs to the whole at every possible 
point in time in which observations could be possibly made. Obviously enough, 
we are not naively reading the model as if it purported that the parts that 
compound FLB do not undergo processes of growing, maturation, decay, and so 
on. What we actually mean is that a model is preferable in which, as it happens 
with the ‘gradient’ concept, parts are developmentally recruited, so not every one 
is present at every developmental stage, or not with the same intensity and 
extent. Thus in our opinion, an accurate image to render the process of the 
growth of language is one of different developmental paths more or less concur-
rently occurring, normally leading to increasingly interactive developmental 
dynamics, progressively bringing about more and more integrated and robust 
units of function. According to this view, language is not ‘more or less’ language 
at any given point of this constructive process. If anything, it is a different form 
of language, in which components that become very strong at a particular point 
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are weaker or even absent at prior or later points. 
 The second point to be added has to do with the relevance of aspects 
external to the organism in Kuo’s original formulation of the ‘gradient’ concept. 
It is our suggestion that respecting this aspect of Kuo’s proposal contains the clue 
to overcome the two forms of dualisms that run, as argued above, against an 
integral developmental treatment of language. It is now perfectly known that the 
impact of verbal stimulation on children starts at an extremely early age, as a 
matter of fact prenatally (see Gervain & Mehler 2010 for a synthesis). Thus res-
ponses to particular aspects of such stimulation are precociously and rapidly 
being embodied by the growing organisms, in all likelihood starting with aspects 
of prosodic and categorical perception pertaining to the phonological domain, in 
such a way that prevents considering from the start that a distinction can be 
made between a biological agent that acquires and a cultural kit of contents that 
are acquired. In other words, a ‘hybridization’ of sorts materializes from the very 
beginnings of language development, considering which the ‘E-language’ against 
‘I-language’ dualism vanishes, given the mutually scaffolding effects coming 
about throughout the process (Griesemer 2014; Balari & Lorenzo 2015b).  
 Within this new framework, moreover, the distinction between linguistic 
contents a priori belonging to human nature, on the one side, and linguistic 
contents resulting from historical processes and subject to social transmission, on 
the other side, lacks most of its original motivation. The growing organic capacity 
that successively becomes suitable to new scaffolding interactions, until attaining 
the overall domains of linguistic competence, appears to be a constraining 
enough force to limit the logical space of possible linguistic outcomes in the ab-
sence of a priori expectations about how the languages of the world are and differ 
(see Kajita 1997 and Lorenzo & Longa 2009 for two congenial approaches).7 For 
the sake of clarity, let us elaborate this a little bit with some relevant illustrations.  
 Within the framework thus far presented motivation is lacking for positing 
a language-specific bias towards, for example, structure-dependent rules (versus 
linear-dependent ones that children never seem to consider; see Chomsky 1975, 
among other places),8 which according to the Chomskyan view is literally coded 
in the brain of children prior to any linguistic experience. Alternatively, one may 
confidently conceptualize the robust observations gathered in this specific area of 
research by just considering what children know about language as they are 
particularly developing it at each developmental stage. In a nutshell, we suggest 
that from a very early age on they most probably scan different sequentially 
organized incoming stimuli on the grounds of a computational device with a 
working memory resolution that makes ‘structural constraints‘ to be naturally 
                                                
7 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting us the connection between 
Kajita’s framework and our developmental ideas.  
8  The locus classicus in the study of this bias is question formation in ‘subject-cum relative 
sentences’, as in Is the man who is tall happy?, with a fronting operation of the main verb. In 
constructing these sentences, children never make errors that could be interpreted as if they 
were considering a linear alternative (e.g. ‘front the first verb’), like *Is the man who tall is 
happy? Children do commit errors when first producing this kind of sentences, but curiously 
enough they again have a structure dependent character: For example, sometimes they 
repeat the main (Can the man who is tall can see Mickey?), but never the first verb (* Is the man 
who is tall can see Mickey? or similar alternatives; see Crain & Nakayama 1987). 
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expected (Gervain et al. 2012). We specifically mean that from a certain degree of 
resolution on, such a device will be able to detect and to retain in working mem-
ory sequences of items (say, x x x x … x x x) for the time and/or with the intensity 
required in order to capture long distance dependencies (say, x x1 x x … x x1), of 
the sort instantiated in linguistic strings like John claimed1 that she was wrong 
emphatically1—where subscripts serve to annotate the points at which a main 
sentence is interrupted by an embedded one and restarted again. Such a degree of 
memory resolution is thus a computational requirement for the kind of nested 
relations through which structure dependent relations hold, obviating other 
putative linear/numerical constrictions. So, contrary to Chomsky’s (2007: 7) sug-
gestion, there seems to be a good reason for children to adopt the ‘structural 
stance’ even in the absence of a genetically coded UG instruction, for this is how 
they optimize a system of computation already in place for the scanning of in-
coming sequential stimuli—which if anything, might be conceptualized as a 
‘third factor’ effect of sorts (Chomsky 2005).9 Children consequently behave as if 
they were (so to speak) ‘linear blind’ (Longa & Lorenzo 2012). Our position is 
thus that as soon as children apply such a computational device to the flow of 
speech they are being exposed to, a linguistic hybrid of sorts is automatically 
created in their minds, the regularities underlying which are unavoidably 
interpreted as structure-dependent. Note that no piece of propositional know-
ledge establishing in advance a universal property of languages seems to be 
required for such a constraining effect to follow. Children may be capable of 
deriving it from the unique perspective of the language particular gradient that 
they are constructing.  
 A next logical expectation from this idea is that as development goes by, it 
successively creates the grounds for constraining further aspects of the 
hybridization process. For example, a language-particular case system (either fol-
lowing an accusative pattern or an ergative one) may within this framework be 
conceptualized as a hybrid outcome of the structure-dependent asymmetry 
detected among the verb’s most prominent arguments, on the one hand, and a 
system of formal marks (case morphology proper, agreement, and so on), on the 
other hand, regarding which the incoming stimulation contains rich positive 
evidence (see, for example, Uriagereka 2007). Again, no particular expectation 
about how languages actually differ in this area of grammar seems to be required 
in order to constrain how the corresponding patterns are fixed. Thus the result-
ing image is one where over-arching or high-level principles of organization (like 
‘structure-dependence’) pave the way to more nuanced or idiosyncratic ones (like 
the formal patterns chosen for marking specific structure-dependent relations), 
which in their turn probably reinforce the supporting operative principles (Balari 
& Lorenzo 2015b). For example, according to Crain & Nakayama’s (1987) classic 
experiments, the bias towards ‘structure-dependence’ is fully operative in 
                                                
9 Chomsky actually incorporates into his list of third factor effects “principles of data analysis 
that might be used in language acquisition and other domains” and “principles of structural 
architecture and developmental constraints,” but he emphatically adds that they correspond 
to “principles not specific to the faculty of language” (Chomsky 2005: 6). So ours is a 
welcome conclusion from a minimalist perspective, but one that clearly goes counter the 
classical view of language ‘as a faculty’. 
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question formation tasks at 3;2 (years;months), but according to Lidz et al. (2003) 
it can already be attested at 1;6 in relation to other structure-dependent pheno-
mena, like one-substitution. As for case marking patterns, a study by Elosegui 
Aduriz (1997) shows that full mastery of both the ergative (Basque) and the accu-
sative (Spanish) patterns of case marking is attested on bilinguals at 3;3, with the 
respective key case distinctions (‘ergative/absolutive’ and ‘nominative/accusa-
tive’) emerging almost concurrently at 2;2–2;5. Such a partially overlapping 
chronogram between the precocious sensitivity to structure dependency and the 
subsequent fixation of a case system pattern, seems particularly fit to support 
Balari & Lorenzo’s (2015b) reinforcing loops hypothesis. 
 Note that the reading according to which children’s first language acqui-
sition occurs as if they were respecting a ‘logical flowchart’ (Baker 2001) that they 
know in advance (see also Yang 2002), thus may be thought of as somehow 
motivated, yet it is simply the effect of viewing the process from the misleading 
perspective of the ultimately attained outcomes. We alternatively contend that 
only by inverting such a logic may one gain a true developmental perspective, 
for it is obvious that constraining influences on development must work the 
other way around: i.e. they must be derivative from the ongoing constructive 
process of the hybrid gradient, on which internal and external forces conspire 
with the hybrid-in-the-way itself to channel its own fate.  
  Turning to the main concern of this paper, we believe that the resulting 
‘gradient of language’ concept fits particularly well with the basic maturational 
observations introduced in the first section of this paper and other, more recent 
findings to be reviewed in section 5. We note above that evidence has accumu-
lated after years of intensive research that language is not monolithically affected 
by a single critical period effect. Effects seem to operate in a more selective way, 
with the ones touching the phonological domain affecting individuals earlier and 
being more noticeable afterwards, the ones touching lexical knowledge having a 
later chart of appearance and being less intrusive, and the ones touching 
morpho-syntax being in a middle ground both in timing and affectation of the 
acquired competence. Current research (Meisel 2013) even points to a more 
nuanced view, in which domains may eventually be parceled out in sub-domains 
motivated on maturational grounds. Such a state of affairs seems in perfect 
agreement with the ideas put forward in this section, which predict a complex 
pattern of maturational milestones as the gradient of language unfolds in time.  
 Moreover, development shows that the ‘faculty-to-be’ is not like a 
miniaturized version of the adult steady counterpart at every different stage that 
we may arbitrarily choose to study. So a more accurate approximation to these 
findings is one that envisions them as the chronological unfolding of an ever-
changing gradient, in which a mostly phonologically biased capacity paves the 
way to increasingly complex units of function where the non-compositional 
lexical component and the compositional morpho-syntactic one take successively 
the lead in the complex. Correspondingly, the ‘behavioral potential’ (Kuo 1976) 
of the evolving capacity advances from its original link to social cognition (e.g. 
social attachment and maternal bond by means of acoustic cues; Locke 1993) to 
the open-ended functionality of adult versions of language (Chomsky 1975, 
1980). 
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3.3. The ‘Gradient of Language’ and the ‘Modularity of Mind’  
 
A relevant question raised by an anonymous reviewer has to do with how the 
‘gradient of language’ concept that we are entertaining here relates to the 
‘modular’ view on the organization of mind, a framework within which the 
‘faculty of language’ has traditionally been perceived as a welcome component. 
Two points of clarification are in order before trying to settle our particular take 
on this issue. The first is that the ‘gradient of language’ is a category that 
primarily belongs to the developmental analysis of language, while ‘modularity’ 
is a category that primarily pertains to the study of mind as a collection of full-
fledged or steady cognitive components. So in a way, one is incurring in a cate-
gory mistake of sorts when trying to evaluate them as competing hypothesis. 
Notwithstanding, and this is our second point of clarification, one may legiti-
mately be interested in deciding whether they are or they are not coherent 
hypotheses from their respective (diachronic and synchronic) points of view. The 
more so attending to the fact that there is not a single or monolithic concept of 
‘modularity’ (Robins 2015), so the door is clearly open to the possibility that one 
or another ‘modularity’ concept is the most congenial with the developmental 
view on language advanced in this paper. Let us briefly dwell on this. 
 Obviously enough, links between ‘modularity’ and ‘development’ have 
previously been suggested. To begin with, the ninth and last of Fodor’s (1983) 
diagnostic features of modularity is a developmental one, according to which 
each module exhibits “a characteristic pace and sequencing”: “[T]he neural 
mechanisms subserving input analysis [a.k.a. modules; SB&GL] develop accord-
ing to specific, endogenously determined patterns under the impact of environ-
mental releasers” (Fodor 1983: 100). Another well-known connection between 
‘modularity’ and ‘development’ is the one suggested in Karmiloff-Smith (1992), 
according to which “the mind becomes modularized as development proceeds” 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992: 4). But for different reasons, none of these seminal ap-
proaches appears to be congenial with the ‘gradient’ view advanced here. As for 
Fodorian modules, developmental determination obtains via a rich, pre-specified 
base of innate information at their disposal (Fodor 1983: 100–101), which contra-
dicts the dynamic and contingent process of module construction that the ‘gradi-
ent of language’ concept should in any event require.10 This is alternatively very 
much in the spirit of Karmiloff-Smith’s model. However, Karmiloff-Smith’s dev-
elopmental perspective mainly boils down to the idea that module construction 
is a pace along a series of distinctive representational formats of increasing expli-
citness within particular mental specializations. The kinds of horizontal negoti-
ations and dynamic accommodations between different bodily capacities that 
define the ‘gradient’ concept seem however alien to Karmiloff-Smith’s idea. 
 Should we consequently quit trying to unite the ‘gradient’ and the ‘modu-
larity’ concepts? Not necessarily, for versions of the latter exist that seem con-
genial with the former, particularly Carruthers’ (2006) ‘weak modularity’, which 
envisions ‘modules’ as emergent and highly interactive functional units, maybe 
                                                
10 For the same reason, ‘massive modularity’ (Pinker 1997) is not an approach congenial with a 
‘gradient’ concept of language either. 
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implemented with an enhanced version of Segal’s (1996) ‘diachronic modularity’, 
namely one that privileges inter-domain penetrability as a developmental 
strategy to build functional modules proper as architectural units at relatively 
more stabilized stages. Along similar lines, Lieberman’s (2006) ‘functional 
systems’ model also shows a desirable degree of compatibility with the ‘gradient’ 
developmental concept, for functional systems are modular in the sense of being 
well-defined specialized architectural components, without precluding their 
sharing specific sub-components. We don’t see any in principle inconvenient in 
adding to Lieberman’s ‘weak modularity’ the idea that by sharing components 
and activity, functional systems may help each other in their respective 
constructive processes. 
 But in the end, the substantial aspect of this issue revolves around the 
empirical consequences of bounding the fate of the ‘gradient of language’ 
concept with a particular vision of the architectural organization of mind—
namely, a weak version of the modularity thesis. In this respect, two promissory 
areas in which predictions may be advanced and confronted with known facts 
are neurobiological findings regarding neural circuitry underlying putatively 
modular abilities and the study of breakdown patterns affecting them (Fodor 
1983: 98–100). We devote sections 5 and 6 to each of these sides of the matter. 
 
 
4. … and What Is Development, that It May Apply to Language 
 
Development is a serially ordered process that is identifiable across time, but it is not defined by 
time. 
Michel & Tyler (2005: 156) 
 
This section inevitably requires a metaphysical opening. There exists a long-
standing persuasion that the workings of nature are alien to the human system of 
categorization and explanation based on teleological categories: i.e. aims, goals, 
stages towards, expected paths and achievements, intermediary points, and so 
on, all of which entail the endeavors of rational/intentional agents (Dennett 
1987). But as a matter of fact, the presence of such a system is pervasive in many 
domains of the natural sciences (for a critique in relation to current functionalist-
oriented biological thinking, see Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini 2010). Kant was par-
ticularly aware of this shortcoming of the life sciences and devoted to the topic 
most of the second part of his Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). Kant’s position was, 
however, somehow compliant with the teleological perspective, in that he under-
stood that in as much as conscience is not lost that the rational/intentional 
categories are inevitably linked to the means by which natural causation becomes 
understandable from a human frame of mind, and not constitutive parts of the 
biological explananda, it may be maintained with no serious harm to the scientific 
enterprise. In any event, that the propensity of transferring the intentional stance 
from the explanatory strategy to the object being explained is a strong one is 
clearly attested by the fact that many functionalist-oriented approaches, particu-
larly in the field of evolutionary biology, continue to take for granted that “teleo-
logical notions are a distinctive and ineliminable feature of biological explan-
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ations” (Allen 2009). The general position underlying the following pages is that 
approaches that cut off the ‘look ahead’ signature of teleology from inter-
pretations of natural facts are better positioned to offer bona fide explanations in 
the corresponding domains than competing frames containing residues of the 
rational/intentional stance.11 
 We thus subscribe here a metaphysical framing for development along the 
lines put forward by developmental systems theoreticians (Oyama 2000a, 2000b; 
Oyama et al. 2001) or probabilistic epigeneticists (Gottlieb 1997, 2007), according 
to which nothing is contained (not even required) within organisms (plans, 
programs, blueprints, pre-installed structure, an so on) in order for development 
to unfold following highly predictable paths leading to highly predictable out-
comes: It suffices to recruit resources anew and to repeat processes afresh in 
order to expected (yet not completely guaranteed) outcomes to obtain, given the 
chances that history offers to such contingent cycles to gain robustness and long 
term stability. Variability inevitably becomes a sequitur of such a take on develop-
ment, ranging from the minor signatures of individuality to deleterious forms of 
teratology, through the generation of innovative morphotypes with a prospect of 
evolutionary stabilization. This general view also adheres to the idea, explicitly 
held for example by Minelli (2003, 2011), that development is to be taken as the 
most distinguishing feature of life, if not completely identical to it, and cones-
quently that it may also be taken as an open-ended process, where no clear points 
of termination are to be searched and assigned. This is not in contradiction with 
observations inspiring the contrary conclusion that processes of maturation exist 
that lead to more or less durable steady states; but the default position within this 
general framework is that they do not, and that organic matter is an always 
evolving (i.e. developing) kind of stuff. It is also a consequence of this overall 
view on the organic realm that organisms do not evolve the means to plan, pro-
gram, preview or prefigure their developmental fates; rather, organic resources at 
all levels of organization become liable to persist that directly benefit the 
reiteration of advantageous developmental cycles. According to Minelli’s (2003) 
motto, development exists (primarily at least) just for its own sake. 
 
4.1. The Position of the Gradient of Language within the Theory of Development 
 
Modern linguistics has proven particularly refractory to the kind of non-
teleological approach just reviewed when confronting the problems of language 
acquisition. Traditionally, the image of acquiring a language within the learning 
paradigm was one of ‘successive approximations’ (Skinner 1957) to the adult 
external models. But once the conclusion was settled that the primary linguistic 
data offered to children lack models and are very opaque in relation to crucial 
aspects of the grammatical competence already attested at very early ages (e.g. 
the structure-dependent character of most rules of grammar; see above), the 
consequence was not to abandon an adultocentric stance regarding language 
                                                
11  The position does not entail an eliminative stance concerning the status of ‘intentionality’ as 
a putative biological category in the domain of the mental, in the sense, for example, of 
Searle (1992). The position rather points to a stance according to which ‘intentionality’ is a 
putative biological explanandum, but is not a legitimate biological explanans. 
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acquisition. Contrarily to this, the common move was rather a generalized accep-
tance of the idea that the adult model is almost completely given from the start 
(see Chomsky 1981, Baker 2001, and Yang 2002, for some instantiations of the 
thesis), thus radicalizing adultocentrism with the extra assumption of a perform-
ationist stance, which adds to the ‘aimed at’ character of the process a strict 
‘determination’ and ‘tutelage’ from the inside of the individual that acquires the 
surrounding linguistic conventions. 
 But things may become very different once the idea of a ‘faculty of 
language’, virtually preformed and fated from its very onset, is replaced with the 
alternative ‘gradient of language’ concept along the lines suggested in the 
previous section, as the view is particularly fitted to accommodate what may be 
seen as one of the central axioms of a theory of development (in the sense of 
Minelli & Pradeu 2014): “Development emerges from earlier conditions; it is not 
directed toward later conditions” (Michel & Moore 1995: 21). Earlier conditions 
are of course completely ignorant of their intermediary or ultimate fate (if at all), 
which may change radically, both in structure and functionality, as component 
parts appear, grow, associate with or dissociate from each other, gain or lose 
centrality within the whole, and so on. To wit, as pointed out above the gradient 
of language seems to have its starting point in an effective detector of the quasi-
musical properties of adults’ utterances (pitch contour, rhythm types, and so on). 
The fact that trials aimed at unveiling this ability customarily test them in 
experimental settings in which newborns are defied to tell apart stimuli belong-
ing to different languages (Gervain & Mehler 2010), may help to create the image 
that it is a specifically language-devoted skill. But, as a matter of fact, it probably 
serves in most real situations to create and consolidate the newborn’s affective 
and social bonds with her caretakers (Locke 1993). It is now a well-attested fact 
that later on this ability serves to the children as part of a phonological and 
statistical ‘self-aid’ kit with which they start breaking the continuous speech flow 
into component parts corresponding to ‘word candidates’, which they rapidly 
associate with presumptive meanings (or definitely discard as true words) (see 
Guasti 2002: 74–80, for a presentation and relevant bibliography). According to 
the point of view that we are adhering to here, it is a wrong conceptualization of 
such a developmental sequence that newborns’ musical skills are there from the 
start ‘in order to’ facilitate segmenting the speech flow into word-like units, as a 
part of a ‘program’ of sorts in which language-specific categories (like ‘word’) are 
moreover anticipated. For the sake of the developmental explanation, it suffices 
to say that the corresponding perceptive abilities transform the incoming stimuli 
into one compounded of segments that children match very fast with meaningful 
associations (Carey & Bartlett 1978; Markson & Bloom 1997). Thus from abilities 
related to the musicality of sequences, a lexicon of arbitrary associations starts 
growing as an aspect of the child’s declarative memory (Ullman 2001); a very dif-
ferent claim that saying that the former are directed toward the latter. The advan-
tages that follow from having a catalogue of arbitrary pairings of sensory-motor 
and conceptual percepts may act, obviously enough, in the sense of entrenching 
the original underlying capacities, but they do not transform the latter into an 
anticipation of the lexicon to come in any meaningful sense. Similarly, it is a 
reasonable assumption that as soon as the child breaks the continuity of speech 
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flow into component pieces, the stimulus now perceived as sequentially organ-
ized starts to instigate and strengthen procedural activity (Ullman 2001) capable 
of detecting and memorizing combinatorial patterns,12 paving the way to produc-
tively using them in due time. The number of lexical items known by children at 
a given developmental stage serves as a good predictor of the moment at which 
syntactic abilities emerge (a schematic or telegraphic syntax appears when they 
are entering the hundreds, and around the four hundreds a more productive 
‘adult-like’ one; see Guasti 2002, for a synthesis), which may actually be used for 
diagnostic concerns (Locke 1997; Bates & Goodman 1999). But again, the only 
sensible way of conceptualizing these facts is that from abilities related with the 
identification of discrete units in the stimulus and the increase of items within 
declarative memory, children obtain the opportunity of feeding the development 
of syntactic procedures or routines.  
 A final point of clarification is in order before closing this sub-section. As 
important as clarifying that there is no ‘directed toward’ development is the 
complementary task of explaining that when enumerating cognitive skills 
involved in the acquisition of languages by children, one is not really contemplat-
ing a number of instrumental means to acquire languages: What one is contemp-
lating is just language, period. Language has no other reality and cannot be taken 
apart from the skills of concern, contingently recruited as development pro-
gresses and thus becoming part of a complex pattern of dynamics, where the 
position and the weight of each relatively to the others varies along the way. So 
similarly to how we previously saw that the distinction between ‘languages as 
given out there’ and ‘language as a internal faculty’ (as in the ‘biology-culture’ 
dualism) blurs within our developmental frame, we believe that it may comple-
mentarily also help blur the distinction between ‘the faculty of language’ and its 
putative ‘underpinnings’, for the resulting image of language as a developing 
phenomenon is one of a complexly evolving system that metamorphoses from 
(for example) an English acoustic and statistical detector successively into an 
English fragment of declarative memory, and into an English set of memorized 
compositional procedures, and so on (and the same with whatever other lang-
uage one might be interested in observing from such a longitudinal perspective). 
 
4.2. The Critical Period in Critical Condition 
 
We are now in the position of answering the main question that motivates this 
paper, and in a way that does not differ too much from the answer given by 
Zing-Yang Kuo decades ago regarding the suitability of the critical period 
concept to developmental processes at large: “[…] the concept of critical period 
[…] is of dubious scientific value” (Kuo 1976: 115). Sure enough, Kuo’s is the 
most reasonable conclusion when one accepts the dynamic and ever evolving 
character of every single aspect of the cognitive/behavioral make-up of a species. 
So once the premises are settled (i) that language is a complexly growing system 
in which rather disparate skills are contingently recruited along the way (instead 
                                                
12  Gervain et al. (2012) have experimentally shown that newborns already display similar 
pattern-identification skills in relation to meaningless syllabic stimuli. 
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of a well-delimited faculty from the start), and (ii) that the development of lang-
uage entails the ‘negotiation’ of predominance relations among the successively 
assembled abilities, corresponding to the upsurge of new emergent function-
alities (instead of a monolithically given kind of functionality within the reach of 
children from the outset), then a very different idea of ‘criticality’ in the realm of 
cognition/behavior is due.  
 We also agree with Kuo that a ‘criticality’ concept may be nevertheless 
saved if conceived of in the physicist’s sense in which it names ‘points’ at which 
certain states of matter undergo characteristic modifications (e.g. “the tempe-
rature above which a substance in gaseous form cannot be liquefied no matter 
how much pressure is applied”; Kuo 1976: 115). A congenial notion has also been 
implemented within the dynamic systems approach to the development of 
cognition and action advocated by Thelen & Smith (1994) under the interchange-
able labels of ‘critical’ or ‘transition’ points and in their turn taking inspiration 
from the behavior of chemical reactions. In any event, the term boils down to the 
same idea of points at which continuously evolving complexes acquire the poten-
tial to engage in qualitatively new kinds of processes and/or exhibit qualitatively 
new patterns of activity. Irrespective of the label one prefers to choose, the 
distinguishing feature of this new concept of ‘criticality’ is that it puts the stress 
on the new kinds of events or states to come (given antecedent developmental 
events and present conditions), instead of focusing (as it is the case of the 
classical ‘critical period’ concept) on the potentialities left behind (as windows of 
opportunity close following more o less rigid schedules). 
 In the realm of language, similar ‘critical (or transition) points’ may be 
posited, for example, regarding the critical amount of lexical units that may 
already pave the way to a ‘more procedural’ than ‘declarative’ style of language, 
as observed in most children from their second year of life. It is our suggestion 
that this is the model of ‘criticality’ that ought to be generalized to the experi-
mental evidence reviewed in the first section of this paper. Thus ‘foreign accent’ 
effects observed after minimal delays in the exposure to a second language, for 
example, should simply be seen as the (‘normal’ or ‘characteristic’) kind of reflex 
in production of a phonological system acquired from a certain maturational 
stage of the ongoing language gradient (and/or a certain degree of exposure), 
instead of as a ‘deviant’ outcome of an ill-timed exposure—the reading that one 
would be more prone to follow with the lenses of an orthodox ‘critical period’ 
concept. This interpretation fits in nicely with the observation that a complex of 
nervous fibers exists connecting posterior auditory and more anterior pre-motor 
left hemispheric areas, which is involved in phonological processing tasks and 
attains full maturity rapidly after birth (Friederici 2011). Thus, two partially 
different patterns of phonological assimilation naturally follow, due to the more 
or less earlier exposure to the relevant stimulation. Similarly, the ‘decay’ in the 
capacity of assimilating the morpho-syntax of a second language, customarily 
dated as concurrent with the onset of puberty, should rather be conceptualized as 
the point from which, as if mirroring developmental effects previously observed 
in prepubertal acquisition, the language gradient becomes more ‘declarative’ 
than ‘procedural’ in the relevant domain, so rules are now instantiated following 
a less automatized and more conscious style, maybe closer to the style with 
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which words and idiomatic phrases are instantiated at previous stages of the 
gradient. 
 It has been suggested that similar corrective effects may be obtained by 
completely giving the ‘critical period’ concept up, and adopting instead an 
alternative notion of ‘sensitive period’ (Schneirla & Rosenblatt 1963; Bornstein 
1989; see Locke 1993: 296ff., for the particular case of language). While we agree 
that the concept of ‘sensitive period(s)’ is a well-motivated and relevant one in 
every single developmental realm, yet we have an objection to rise concerning 
whether it truly is the right alternate to its purportedly classical antecedent. As 
explained in Michel & Tyler (2005: 160), the idea of ‘sensitive period’ offers an 
escape hatch to the “clock-like, built-in or predetermined periods in develop-
ment”,13 replacing such teleologically connoted notions with a view according to 
which development itself produces distinctive stages, with an intrinsic ‘variabi-
lity in onset/offset (timing)’, each being constructed from their (causally active) 
predecessors. We have not, as previously said, any conceptual objection to an 
idea of ‘sensitive periodicity’ thus defined; but we think that, if any, it may serve 
as a conceptual surrogate not of the ‘critical period’ concept, but of the idea of 
‘development’ in itself, in case one decides to waive the old word with all its odd 
connotations and to introduce a brand new one to name what, in the end, is just 
development as usual. Conversely, it is our opinion that a concept of ‘criticality’ 
along the lines of this sub-section adds something substantive within such a 
renewed view of ‘sensitive’ development, so they are complements instead of 
competitors of each other.14 
 
 
5. Some Neurobiological Evidence 
 
It is important to see that there is not a cultural level above the psychological above the biological, 
but many interpenetrating ones. 
William Wimsatt (2007: 136) 
 
Throughout this paper we have been developing an alternative conception of 
language acquisition, based on the notion of ‘language gradient’ as a natural 
replacement of such theoretical constructs as ‘the faculty of language’ on which 
classical models of language acquisition are based. It has been our contention that 
with the notion of gradient a much more integrative view of cognitive develop-
ment in general and language acquisition in particular is made possible, with the 
net effect of making these processes virtually indistinguishable from the onto-
                                                
13  But maybe not always: For example, Bornstein’s (1989) is an exhaustive, but rather conventi-
onal framework for disentangling ‘sensitive period’ effects, where ‘sensitive’ is perfectly in-
terchangeably for ‘critical’ in the most traditional sense. 
14  Actually, Schneirla & Rosenblatt (1963) insisted on clarifying that their own concept of ‘sen-
sitivity’ as applied to development simply boiled down to the idea (maybe the platitude) 
that developmental events are fuelled, at every developmental stage, by the conspiracy of the 
state already attained from previous events and the environmental inputs that the organism 
becomes reactive to given that particular state. Therefore, their ‘sensitive period(s)’ concept 
does not entail (but also does not exclude) the identification of characteristically ‘critical’ 
landmarks. 
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geny of the organism. In other words, our proposal promotes cognitive and 
linguistic development to the status of bona fide ontogenetic processes rather than 
ascribing them to the class of processes traditionally tagged as ‘psychological 
development’ taking place through the interaction with a properly articulated 
biological substrate. By blurring the biology/psychology-culture divide, we sub-
mitted that a novel interpretation is possible—from a non-teleological and non-
adultocentric perspective—of an ample body of acquisition data concerning in 
particular the long-debated issue of critical periods. The pertinent question at this 
point is whether our view finds some independent support. This is the main 
purpose of this section. 
 In the last decade, a number of interesting works have been published on 
the matter of critical periods, with special reference to their molecular basis. It 
should be pointed out from the outset, however, that, as we suggested in the last 
paragraph of the previous section, critical/sensitive periods are the hallmark of 
development, in the sense that the emergence of virtually any developmental 
product is restricted to a more or less flexible time window (Hensch 2004). Thus, 
the question eventually reduces to what is meant by ‘criticality’: Either (i) a pre-
specified or innately determined point in developmental time where the oppor-
tunity window is closed, or (ii) a stage in development in which, for whatever 
reason, the appropriate scaffolds are not present with the consequence of pre-
cluding the emergence of some expected developmental products and driving 
the process through a different, perhaps novel pathway. 
 Neurobiologist Eric Knudsen has contributed a number of important works 
to the understanding of critical periods. In a review article published in 2004, he 
proposed the following definition: 
 
The term ‘sensitive period’ is a broad term that applies whenever the effects 
of experience on the brain are unusually strong during a limited period in 
development. Sensitive periods are of interest to scientists and educators 
because they represent periods in development during which certain 
capacities are readily shaped or altered by experience. Critical periods are a 
special class of sensitive periods that result in irreversible changes in brain 
function.     (Knudsen 2004: 1412; our 
emphasis) 
 
 Two points are of particular importance here: (i) the decisive role played by 
experience in defining the boundaries of the sensitive period, and (ii) inclusion of 
critical periods as a subclass of sensitive periods. A third factor also mentioned 
by Knudsen is that “although sensitive periods are reflected in behavior, they are 
actually a property of neural circuits”. In this latter connection, Knudsen 
establishes a typology of neural circuitry on the basis of its inherent stability or 
plasticity. Thus, at one extreme of the continuum defined by this typology, we 
find those circuits that, for obvious reasons, possess an initial pattern of con-
nectivity that is extremely resistant to change, due to the strengths of their con-
nections. These circuits are built up essentially through endogenous processes, 
i.e. independently of experience, and are often those on whose functioning 
depends the activity of other, more plastic circuits, as it is the case of those 
“circuits located near the sensory or motor periphery, such as in the retina or the 
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spinal cord” (Knudsen 2004: 1413). At the other extreme of the continuum are 
those circuits with an ample range of potential more or less stable patterns, 
attainable as development proceeds and experiential input through the sensory 
systems is supplied as a function of the availability of the appropriate stimuli in 
the environment. In between these two extremes, a variety of neural circuits 
exists with different degrees of stability and sensitivity to change. 
 To be sure, Knudsen’s preferred metaphor to represent the development of 
neural circuits is that of the well of attraction or stability landscape, already fami-
liar from dynamical systems theory or the developmental landscapes Conrad 
Waddington used to illustrate his notion of canalization. In this sense, less plastic 
circuits will be those with deeper wells of attraction and, consequently, only 
capable of changing if high amounts of energy are spent to perturb their strongly 
canalized pathways. Less stable circuits, on the other hand, will be reactive to 
weaker doses of perturbation, but will nevertheless be able to reach one or more 
stable patterns through the action of repeated experience (p. 1417) or, in the 
absence thereof, through the operation of “homeostatic mechanisms, intrinsic to 
neurons and circuits, which attempt to maintain a minimal level of impulse 
activity in developing neural circuits” (p. 1420).15 Note already how close this 
idea of criticality is to the one Kuo urged us to adopt in the 1970s. 
 A number of conclusions can already be drawn from this. First and fore-
most, sensitive/critical periods are not series of windows of opportunity that 
open and close following a predetermined developmental schedule but rather 
stages characterized by variable degrees of plasticity in a global process tending 
to maximize stability.16 Stability is not guaranteed, however, as it is highly depen-
dent on the degree of plasticity of the system, on the one hand, but also on the 
intensity of the experience, on the other hand. Accordingly, even the most stable 
circuits are liable to change if perturbations are strong enough to make them 
revert to earlier stages or to follow alternative pathways, although, logically 
enough, the more deeply entrenched (Wimsatt 1986, 2001, 2007) the circuit the 
more difficult will be to perturb it, as highly entrenched systems often act as 
scaffolds to later-developing systems, and alterations of their functionality may 
have negative effects on the global stability of the whole system to the point of 
being deleterious.17 Thus, the boundaries defining the onset and termination of 
sensitive/critical periods are not pre-established by some developmental clock, 
but are nevertheless more or less predictable given the very same dynamics of 
developmental processes seen as continuous chains of stabilization and scaffold-
                                                
15  We will not offer here a detailed account of the neuroanatomical and molecular events 
associated to sensitive periods, but the reader may refer to Knudsen’s paper for a general 
exposition. For a more detailed review, with special emphasis on visual and auditory 
circuits, the work of Takao Hensch and his team is particularly relevant; see Hensch (2004, 
2005), Morishita & Hensch (2008), and Barkat et al. (2011). 
16  This is therefore perhaps the only sense in which one can say that developmental processes 
are goal-directed. This is nonetheless an interpretation of goal-directedness that is much 
closer to the physical notion of thermodynamic equilibrium than to the traditional teleo-
logical definition based, for example, on ideal adult models. 
17  In Balari & Lorenzo (2015b) irreversibility was highlighted as one of the hallmarks of devel-
opmental products. In light of the discussion in the text, this is clearly too strong, but the 
idea may be easily reformulated in terms of generative entrenchment and the degree of stab-
ility of the said developmental products. 
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ing effects. 
 This hierarchical organization of neural circuitry, with downstream sys-
tems dependent on other, more entrenched ones prompts, Knudsen’s recommen-
dation that researchers should be wary at the time of positing critical periods at 
the behavioral level (Knudsen 2004: 1421). The reason is that downstream 
systems tend to remain plastic, retaining the ability to compensate for potential 
abnormalities stabilized in the most entrenched ones. This situation may have the 
effect that irreversibility at the circuit level need not necessarily mean 
irreversibility at the behavioral level. In our opinion, this observation reinforces 
our gradient view of development, since behavioral/psychological categories like 
‘language’, based on idealized adult models, tend to be much too coarse-grained 
to be applicable at all stages of the developmental process. As we pointed out in a 
previous section, if anything, ‘language’ is ‘language’ from the very beginning, 
but with the specific properties characteristic of each stage of the process attained 
through the participation of the different elements of the gradient. 
 We are ready to accept, however, that this does not really solve the 
question of ‘language’ in one direction or another. To be sure, despite Knudsen’s 
advice, all the experimental data reviewed earlier could still be interpreted in the 
sense that some language specific system is susceptible to show criticality effects. 
For one reason: That sensory systems undergo maturational processes is well-
known since, at least, the 1960s with David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel’s experi-
ments on the visual cortex of kittens (see Wiesel 1982 for an overview). Thus, one 
could argue, language is just another example of this, but one that does not 
contradict the idea that there are language-ready systems that require linguistic 
input to unfold or the idea that language, as a cultural phenomenon, requires a 
properly developed biological substrate to be acquired. For example, a celebrated 
experiment performed by Mayberry & Lock (2003) could receive any of these two 
interpretations. In a nutshell, Mayberry and Lock analyzed language perform-
ance of early vs. late acquirers of both spoken and signed languages in order to 
test “whether the onset of language acquisition in early life is related to the 
subsequent ability to learn any other language for the remainder of life, 
independent of the sensory and motor modalities of the first or second lang-
uages” (Mayberry & Lock 2003: 370). All tests assessed syntactic abilities through 
a variety of tasks comprising, for example, grammaticality judgments, sentence 
to picture matchings, etc. Perhaps not surprisingly, the final results suggested 
“that language experience during human development dramatically alters the 
capacity to learn throughout life” (p. 380). Mayberry and Lock’s conclusions are 
somewhat puzzling. Thus, while they dismiss an interpretation in terms of a 
genetically specified ability and favor the idea of an epigenetic process “whereby 
environmental experience during early life drives and organizes the growth of 
this complex behavioral and neurocortical system” (p. 382), they characterize the 
critical period for language as “a time-delimited window in early life where the 
degree and complexity of neurocortical development underlying the language 
system is governed” (p. 382). The conclusion is puzzling, in our opinion, because, 
while the authors are ready to accept that cortical structures develop, nothing of 
the sort applies to language, which is ‘out there’ waiting to be learned by the 
appropriate structure. It certainly does not escape the teleological, adultocentric 
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model we are arguing against in this paper. 
 So, the question is: Are there any acquisition data unequivocally or at least 
strongly supporting the gradient view? We believe there are, and we would like 
to close this section by briefly reviewing them. 
 In the early 1970s, Peter Eimas demonstrated experimentally that 1-month-
old human infants are capable of perceiving speech sounds categorically (Eimas 
et al. 1970, Eimas 1974). Moreover, it was also shown that the ability to categori-
cally discriminate certain distinctions at a very early age was lost as acquisition 
proceeded of a language in which such contrasts are not functional (Eimas 1975). 
These results were interpreted as evidence for the existence of a universal and 
innately specified human- and language-specific phonetic detector system oper-
ating in a selectionist mode as acquisition proceeded, stabilizing on a system of 
phonetic categories on the basis of phonetic evidence provided by the environ-
ment. Such interpretation was soon called into question when categorical percep-
tion of speech sounds was also experimentally observed in a non-human species 
(Kuhl & Miller 1975, 1978). This is an old story, and a well known one. Clearly, 
categorical perception of speech was not an ability based on some language-
specific processing device, but rather the human system of phonetic categories 
was constructed on the basis of oppositions to which the mammalian or even the 
vertebrate ear is highly sensitive.18 This story also signals the beginning of a 
fruitful research program on the acquisition of linguistic capacities that strongly 
supports the developmental view we have been defending in this paper. 
 In 1991, Kuhl (1991) described the ‘perceptual magnet effect’ in the proces-
sing of speech sounds by human adults. In essence, Kuhl’s finding was based on 
the earlier discovery that speech categories have an internal structure and are 
organized around a prototypical center (Grieser & Kuhl 1989). The prototype 
then acts as a ‘magnet’ during perceptual tasks in such a way that all stimuli 
assigned to the category are interpreted in terms of the prototype. According to 
Kuhl (1991), this effect would explain the gradual loss of the ability to perceive 
categorically non-native sounds already observed by Eimas (1975) and later con-
firmed by Janet Werker and collaborators (Werker et al. 1981, Werker & Tees 
1984). Another interesting finding of Kuhl’s experiments was that the perceptual 
reorganization observed by Werker & Tees (1984) is a strictly human phenome-
non—not observed in monkeys, for example—and partially completed around 6 
months of age. 
 Summarizing so far, speech perception is driven by a deeply entrenched 
ability to perceive categorically which, in humans, acts as a scaffold to later 
construct a richly structured system of phonetic categories on the basis of the 
stimuli supplied by the environment. This system drives subsequent speech 
perception, acting as a filter where prototypes function as ‘magnets’ attracting 
those stimuli that are similar but not identical to the prototype and thus pro-
ducing the typical effect observed in the processing of non-native sounds. The 
question now is what role does this early form of language plays in later stages of 
                                                
18  Later experiments showed that the ability to perceive categorically is also found in many 
other nonhuman species, like apes, monkeys, and birds; see Balari et al. (2013: 497–499) for a 
brief discussion of these results and references. 
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the acquisition process. 
 New evidence supporting this view was reported in Kuhl (2000, 2004), 
where a number of experiments using neural imaging techniques are presented 
suggesting that perceptual reorganization is caused by what Kuhl calls ‘native 
language neural commitment’ (NLNC). In essence, NLNC would be an example 
of neural circuitry that has reached a relatively stable state for the processing of 
auditory inputs and thus showing a certain degree of criticality in the sense that 
non-native sounds are processed according to the stabilized patterns to which the 
system is sensitive. In Kuhl’s (2000, 2004) words, early language experience liter-
ally “warps perception” of further linguistic input and thus “interferes with the 
processing of information that does not conform to the learned pattern” (Kuhl 
2000: 11855). As later research demonstrated (Kuhl et al. 2005, Kuhl et al. 2008), 
NLNC, a form of entrenchment, positively acts as a scaffold for further language 
development, boosting the development of grammatical skills. Interestingly, this 
is a form of a critical period effect, in the sense that NLNC hinders the develop-
ment of a second language once the neural network has reached a high degree of 
stabilization, a point previously raised in Marchman (1993). Concomitantly, 
however, variable degrees of neural commitment have been observed (Kuhl et al. 
2008) such that lower levels of stabilization give rise to slower acquisition of 
further skills, but favor, should the environment include foreign language input, 
the eventual development of a second language, as it is the case with bilingual 
infants; see Kuhl et al. (2008: §5) for details. 
 Everything considered, we believe that the evidence reviewed clearly sup-
ports the gradient view of language development proposed here. One in which 
different components participate in different degree and intensity at different 
stages, in which a gradual hybridization is effected, starting with the develop-
ment of prototypical phonetic categories, and proceeding through the develop-
ment of later skills in a continuous chain of entrenchment and scaffolding effects 
(Dove 2012). 
 
 
6.  Final Remarks: Broadening Our Understanding and Appreciation of 
Linguistic Varieties through the ‘Gradient of Language’ Concept 
 
In closing this reflection, we want to briefly stress two advantages of adopting a 
renewed view of ‘criticality’ along the lines put forward in the previous sections, 
each of a different character, but both ultimately related. The first has to do with 
the suitability of the idea of ‘gradient of language’, which replaces here the con-
cept of ‘faculty of language’, as well as the associated ‘critical point(s)’ concept, to 
accommodate certain intriguing findings recently exposed in Hankock & Bever 
(2013). After following up an intensive research on groups with a relatively high 
incidence of familial sinistrality, the authors present the conclusion there that 
individuals belonging to such groups (not necessarily left-handed) show a certain 
advantage relatively to the outgroup in some linguistic skills, like the quickness 
with which they access and retrieve lexical (declarative) information. From this 
observation, Hancock and Bever raise some unorthodox, yet reasonable claims 
concerning the character of language: Namely, that it may display more than one 
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‘normal’ form of neurological/computational architecture, and correspondingly 
more than one ‘normal’ system of associated behavioral reflexes. Such a 
conclusion, anchored as shown in well-attested observations, agrees with the 
expectations of the view on language defended in this paper as a convoluted 
system of neurological/computational resources, contingently assembled as the 
corresponding gradient evolves and consequently open to a range of variation 
within which several architectural/computational styles may fit comfortably (for 
example, more or less ‘declarative’ vs. ‘procedural’ styles). As, according to Han-
cock and Bever, such an expectation seems to be fulfilled within the limits of 
what are considered ‘normal’ patterns of linguistic development and behavior, 
we suggest referring to such variants as ‘computational styles’, or ‘computational 
dialects’, respecting the traditional term in linguistics (‘dialect’) to refer to all 
classes of ‘normal’ variability. 
 Note that once such a move is made, nothing prevents us form extending 
the range of expected variability to slightly but increasingly deviant styles: For 
example, variants in which characteristic physiognomies and/or intellectual dis-
abilities selectively impact on the language capacity, but with mild to moderate 
effects—as it is the case of Down syndrome, particularly in the expressive side 
(Martin et al. 2009); or variants in which other non-radically disruptive effects are 
observed—for example, a differential ability to deal with names as compared 
with verbs, in the context of certain developmental conditions, like Potocki-
Lupski syndrome (Vares 2015).19 Generalizing this, what obtains is a gradient of 
linguistic conditions, in clear agreement with the gradient character of language 
in the developmental sense that we have defended in this paper. Likewise, 
nothing prevents us from extending the gradient as to also cover the transition 
from monolingualism to different forms of multilingualism—actually con-
forming a complex spectrum with many transitional forms of multidialectalism 
in between, the cognitive/linguistic reflexes of which (differences in executive 
control tasks, visual and speech perception, etc.) are now becoming to be under-
stood (Sebastián-Gallés & Díaz 2012; Sebastián-Gallés et al. 2012, Hernández et al. 
2013). Developmentally speaking, the resulting gradient view purports that lang-
uage is not circumscribed to a particular compartment of our mind/brain, but 
spreads on a complexly interactive system of bodily capacities subject to the im-
pact of a correspondingly complex array of developmental influences, both endo-
genous and exogenous. Such a picture makes very unlikely the idea of a faculty 
of language as an epitome of sorts, from the point of view of which impaired, 
lessened or even enhanced variants must be deemed exceptionally deviant.20 
 Our second and final remark points to the added suitability of the develop-
mental framework unfolded here to overcome the inconveniences of a vocabu-
lary too much loaded with normative connotations, as the one displayed in prior 
passages (with all its occurrences of ‘normal’ within quotation marks). Forms of 
language are routinely referred to as ‘abnormal’, ‘deviant’, ‘impaired’, and so on, 
which obviously entails a ‘normal’ point of reference, as well as ‘second’, which 
                                                
19 Verb–noun dissociations are also a well-known effect in the context of different forms of 
acquired aphasia. See Kambanaros & Grohmann (forthcoming), and references therein. 
20 We are grateful to Kleanthes Grohmann for sharing his thoughts on these ideas.  
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purports a question of priority, or ‘foreign’, an administrative condition com-
pletely alien to the way languages are acquired. We are not suggesting that labels 
like these are not necessary at least in some of the fields where they are applied. 
Our message rather is that they must be handled with extreme care and ideally 
even replaced when the aims of research have to do with purely developmental 
matters. Some of them (for example, ‘impaired language’) name exceptional 
courses of development (as when ‘specific language impairment’ is said to affect 
to 7% of people), which sometimes leave the individual in a more or less 
handicapped position; but some other times differences are negligible, revealed 
only after close technical scrutiny. Some other forms are however as common as 
so-called ‘normal’ language, like modalities of languages acquired and used in 
adulthood. In all these cases the developmental perspective, which must be 
ignorant of normative considerations, should see, again, just cognitive or 
computational dialects in such varieties (see Corder 1981, for some pioneering 
suggestions along similar lines; see also Boeckx & Benítez-Burraco 2014, for some 
recent observations). The move may perhaps prove also useful to remove many 
language-related stigmas and to promote more proactive attitudes in rehabili-
tation or reconstructive endeavors (Michel & Tyler 2005). 
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